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MARCH, 1922 No. 5 
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 1920-1921, V1 
VIII. JurusnrcTION AND PROCEDURE oF CouRTs2 
I. The E.xtent of Federal litdicial Power 
(a) Cases Arising under the Constitution or Laws of the United 
States. 
The question whether a case presents a "federal question,'' so 
called, is raised in a number of the controversies in which the 
1 For the preceding instalments, see 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. I-23, I35-I72, 26!-
288, 38I-4o6 (November, I92I-February, 1922). 
2 Various aspects of judicial review of thq constitutionality of legislation 
are considered in Orrin N. Carter, "Constitutional Decisions of Justice Cart-
wright," IS ILL. L. REv. 237; Robert Eugene Cushman, "Constitutional Deci-
sions by a Bare Majority of the Court," 19 MICH. L. REv. 771, and "Mar-
shall and the Constitution," 5 MINN. L. Rl;v. I; W. F. Dodd, "Presentation 
of Constitutional Questions in Illinois,'' 3 ILL. L. Buu,. III; F. W. Grinnell, 
"Some Forgotten History About the Duty of Courts in· Dealing with Uncon-
stitutional Legislation," 54 Al.ntR. L. REv. 419; Wm. H. Lloyd, "Pylkington's 
Case and Its Successors,'' 6g U. PA. L. REv. 20; Fred A. Maynard, "Five to 
Four Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States," 54 AM:ER. L. 
Ri;v. 481; Francis Newton Thorpe, "Hamilton's Ideas in Marshall's Deci-
sions," I BosroN U. L. R:Ev. 60; John Barker Waite, "Public Policy and Per-
sonal Opinion," 19 MrcH. L. REv. 265; and notes in 21 CoLUM. L. R:Ev. 288 
on jurisdiction to pass on constitutionality of initiatory petition, in 34 HARV. 
L. Ri;v. 86 on what persons are entitled to raise the issue of unconstitution-
ality, and in 5 MINN. L. Ri;v. 81 on whether court can review legislative 
declaration that law is an emergency measure not subject to referendum. 
For discussion of declaratory judgments, see Edwin M. Borchard, "The 
Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgments,'' 34 HARV. L. REv. 6g7; W. F. Dodd, 
"Michigan Declaratory Judgment Decision," 6 A. B. A. JouR. 145; Maurice 
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asserted federal question was considered and answered. Only a 
few of these instances need special mention. In Hartford Life Ins. 
Co. v. Blincoe,3 after reversal by the Supreme Court of a state 
judgment against a· defendant, a second judgment was rendered 
by the state court on different grounds. These included holding 
an assessment on an insurance policy to be void for the inclusion 
of a state ta..x not legally due. On the second advent of the case to 
the Supreme Court it was held that no federal question was pre-
sented by the state decisio1:1 as to the amount of the tax or on the 
issue whether the company was doing business on the assessment 
or the premium plan. In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. McGrew Coal 
Co.4 the refusal of a state court, in a suit founded on a state long-
and short-haul statute, to dismiss the action of the shipper because 
he did not pay the freight and was not damaged, was held to raise 
no substantial federal question, but only a question of state law 
which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review. In Min-
neapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry. Co. v. Washbum Coal Co.6 a state 
judgment denying a carrier an action against a shipper for freight 
in excess of the statutory rate subsequently declared confiscatory 
was affirmed on the theory that it rested on grounds of contract 
law which raised no federal question so long as the state court did 
not sustain the statutory rate as valid. In Bullock v. Florida6 a 
state decision that a railroad may not abandon operations without 
the consent of the state was held to raise a federal question, but 
E. Harrison, "California Legislation 0£ I92I Providing for Declaratory 
Relief," 9 CALIF. L. REv. 359; James Schoonmaker, "Declaratory Judgment," 
5 MINN. L. REv. 32, I72; ·and notes in 2I CoLUM. L. REv. I68, I9 MICH. L. 
REv. 86, and 30 YALE L. J. I6I, 204. The duty to give advisory opinions is 
treated in 34 HARV. L. REv. 673. 
Special courts for special purposes are considered in Henry B. Higgins, 
"A New Province for Law and Order," 34 HARV. L. REv. 105; H. W. Humble, 
"The Court of Industrial Relations in Kansas," I9 MICH. L. REv. 675; Wil-. 
liam Reynolds Vance, "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations with Its 
Background," 30 YALE L. J. 456; Edward F. Waite, "Courts of Domestic 
Relations," 5 MINN. L. REv. I6I; J. S. Young, "Industrial Courts with Spe-
cial Reference to the Kansas Experiment," 5 MINN. L. REv. 39, I85, 353; 
and a note in 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 90I on small claims courts 
3 255 U. S. I29, 4I Sup. Ct. (I92I), 20 MICH. L. REv. 267. 
"-256 U. S. I34 4I Sup. Ct. 404 (I92I). 
G 254 U. S. 370, 4I Sup. Ct. I40 (I920), 20 MICH. L. REv. 282. 
6 254 U.S. 5I3, 41 Sup. Ct. I93 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. REv. 286. 
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the issue whether a state would be bound by a foreclosure decree 
was declared to be purely a question of local law. In Marshall v. 
New Y ork7 the issue whether a lien for taxes -given by the common 
law of New York is a prerogative right or merely a rule of admin-
istration was held to be one of local law on which the federal courts 
will accept as conclusive the decisions of the New York courts. On 
the other hand, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ault8 held that in an 
action against the director general of railroads in which the Act 
of Congress permitting the application of state police laws was 
construed not to include laws imposing a penalty, the question 
whether a state provision is penal or compensatory is one of fed-
eral law and not of state law: 
In the foregoing cases federal jurisdiction over the controversy 
was not dependent solely on the particular issues mentioned. In 
two cases, however, efforts to initiate proceedings in the federal 
courts were frustrated for entire lack of federal jurisdiction. In 
Vallely v. Northern, Fire & Marine Ins. Co:9 an insurance company 
without objection on its part was adjudged a bankrupt by the dis-
trict court. It was undisputed that the company was an insurance 
company and that the bankruptcy law does not apply to insurance 
companies. The Supreme Court held therefore that the case did 
not arise under a law of the United States and that the district 
court was without jurisdiction, differentiating the situation from · 
cases where the question is whether the bankrupt is chiefly engaged 
in farming or whether there is diversity of citizenship, in which 
cases there is jurisdiction to decide the question and in which an 
erroneous decision may be binding if not appealed from. 
Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Unitm10 was a pro-
ceeding to enjoin a labor union. References in the bill to the fact 
that the contracts interfered with by the striking defendants were 
for supplies for the United States government and involved inter-
state commerce were said by Mr. Justice Clarke to be "much too 
casual and meager to give serious color to the claim now made that 
the cause of action asserted is one arising under the laws of the 
7 254 U. S. 380, 41 Sup. Ct. 143 (1920). 
8 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 593 (1921). 
9 254 U. S. 348, 41 Sup. Ct. 116 (1920). 
10 254 U. S. 77, 41 Sup. Ct. 39 (1920). 
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United States," and the contention was characterized as "an after-
thought" and plainly not in the mind of the writer of the bill of 
complaint. Justices Pitney and McReynolds dissented, but with-
out indicating whether it was on this issue or on the further holding 
that jurisdiction did not exist on account of diversity of citizenship. 
In Stark Brothers Nurseries & Orchards Co. v. Stark11 there 
was federal jurisdiction to award damages for infringement of a 
trademark registered under the Act of Congress to the extent that 
such damages arose after notice to the infringer. This was held 
to be the only cause of action arising under the federal statute so 
that the district court was without jurisdiction to award damages 
for infringement prior to such notice. 
A suit against a federal reserve bank was held in American Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank12 to be one arising under the 
laws of the United States, since it has long been established that 
this is the nature of a suit against a defendant incorporated by the 
United States. As to the contention that the suit was not within 
the Judicial Code of I9n, Mr. Justice Holmes remarked: 
"The contrary is established, and the accepted doctrine is 
intelligible at least since it is part of the plaintiff's case that 
the def~ndant bank existed and exists as an entity capable of 
committing the wrong alleged and of being sued. These facts 
depend upon the laws of the United States." 
Provisions in the Judicial Code making national banking associa-
tions, for the purposes of suit against them, citizens of the states 
in which they are respectively located were held not to apply to 
the federal reserve banks created after the Code was enacted. 
There was difference of opinion in Smith v. Kansas City Title 
& Trust Co.13 as to whether a suit to enjoin a state bank from 
purchasing bonds issued by the federal farm loan banks was a suit 
arising under the laws or Constitution of the United States. The 
federal questions in the case were whether Congress had power to 
create the farm loan banks and to exempt their assets from state 
taxation. For himself and Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice 
11 255 U. S. 50, 41 Sup. Ct. 221 (1921). 
12 256 U. S: -, 41 Sup. Ct. 499 (1921). 
13 255 U. S. ,r8o, 41 Sup. Ct. 243 ( 1921), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 18-20. 
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Holmes insisted that the legality of the investment was material 
only because made so by the state law creating the state bank and 
restricting its powers of investment. The Missouri law therefore 
, created the _cause of action and a suit cannot arise under any other 
law than that which creates the cause of action. The federal law, 
he continued, "must create at least a part of the cause of action by 
its own force, for it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must 
arise under the law of the United States." For the majority, Mr. 
Justice Day invoked the broader principle that where it appears 
from the bill "that the right to relief depends upon the construction 
or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and 
that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a 
reasonable foundation, the District Court has jurisdiction under 
this provision." He relied also on quotations from Chief Justice 
Marshall that a case "may truly be said to arise under the Consti-
tution or a law of the United States whenever its correct decision 
depends upon a construction of either" and when "the title or right 
set up by the party may be defeated by one construction of the 
Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the 
opposite construction." 
Other issues of federal jurisdiction were wholly statutory or 
depended on common law principles. Among them are the right 
to award costs after the dispute has become moot,14 and such ques-
tions as whether the decision below is a final one,15 whether the 
jurisdiction of the district court as a federal court was involved 
so that there may be direct appeal to the Supreme Court,16 whether 
under the mandate of the Supreme Court the district court may 
retain jurisdiction,17 and whether under the Lever Act a district 
court in passing on claims for the requisition of supplies sits as a 
court of claims so that a direct writ of error lies from the Supreme 
Court.18 
1 4Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 522 (1921). 
lG'Baldwin Co. v. Howard Co., 256 U. S. 35, 41 Sup. Ct. 405 (1921); 
American Steel Foundries v. Whitehead, 256 U.S. 40, 41 Sup. Ct. 407 (1921). 
• 16 De Rees v. Costaguta, 254 U. S. 166, 41 Sup. Ct. 6g (1920); Louie v. 
United States, 254 U. S. 548, 41 Sup. Ct. 188 (1921). 
17 Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co., 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 
558 (1921). 
18 United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 569 (1921). 
474 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
(b) Controversies between Citizens of Different States. 
Federal jurisdiction was denied in Niles-Benient-Po_nd Co. v. 
Iron Moitlders' Union,19 in which a New Jersey corporation sued 
an Ohio corporation and Ohio members of a labor union, because 
it appeared that the defendant Ohio corporation was completely 
controlled by the plaintiff New Jersey corporation and that there 
was no substantial controversy or "collision of interest" between 
the two, so that on the basis of real interest the two corporations 
should be aligned as plaintiffs, which would make one of the plain-
tiffs a citizen of the same state as the defendants.20 
An apparent if not real exception to the rule invoked in the pre-
ceding case is illustrated by Sitprenie Tribe of Ben Hitr v. Cauble.21 
This was a suit in the federal court to enjoin a state action by 
Indiana citizens against an Indiana mutual benefit society. The 
basis of the request for the injunction was that the matter in issue 
had previously been concluded in a "class-suit" brought in the fed-
eral court by non-Indiana citizens against the Indiana society. 
Jurisdiction of the present proceeding was sustained as ancillary 
to the prior class-suit. The Indiana citizens contended that had 
they really been parties to the prior suit federal jurisdiction on 
account of diversity of citizenship would have been defeated, and 
that the fact that it had been entertained established that they were 
not necessary parties and therefore were not bound by the decree. 
The court's rejection of the contention involves the holding that if 
there is the requisite diversity of citizenship between the nominal 
parties to a class suit, federal jurisdiction is not defeated because 
other persons having identity of interest with the plaintiffs are citi-
zens of the same state as the defendant even though the nominal 
plaintiffs represent the interests of those not included so as to con-
clude them by- the result of the litigation. The situation involves 
the dilemma that class suits fail in their purpose unless they bi~d 
11> Note 10, supra. See 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 692. • 
20 In 20 Cor.UM. L. REv. 917 is a note on a case holding that an insane 
person is not the real party in interest in a suit brought by his committee 
and that therefore the citizenship of the latter and not of the former deter-
mines whether suit can be brought in the federal courts on account of diver-
sity of citizenship. 
21 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1921). See 21 Cor.ui.r. L. REv. 487 and 
19 MrcH. L. REv. 759. 
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all members of the class, including those who are fellow citizens 
of the defendant; and that dass suits can seldom be instituted in 
the federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship if juris-
diction is defeated whenever any member of the class is a fellow 
citizen of the defendant. Support for the choice of the horn seized 
was found in a rule of the cour1l which appeared to authorize it and 
in the inconvenience of the opposite result, 
So far as the Constitution is concerned there is no limitation as 
to the law which federal courts shall apply in controversies between 
citizens of different states. Congress, however, has provided that, 
subject to certain exceptions, the laws of the several states shall be 
regarded as the rules of decision .in trials at common law, in the 
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply. In inter-
preting this provision decisions of a state court on questions of 
"general jurisprudence" are not accepted by the federal courts as 
conclusive evidence of the law of the state. In proceedings in 
equity, which are not within the terms of the federal statute, fed-
eral courts assume even greater latitude in deciding for themselves 
what is the law of the state. A striking instance of this appears 
in Wells-Fargo & Co. v. Taylor.22 This was a bill brought in a fed-" 
eral court by reason of diversity of citizenship to enjoin a success-
ful plaintiff in a state court from taking any steps to enforce his 
state judgment. The plaintiff in the original action was an employee 
of an express company and the defendant was the railroad held by 
the state court to be responsible for his injury. The express com-
pany's interest in the matter was due to its obligation to indemnify 
the railroad company. It comes into the federal court and gets an 
injunction against enforcing the state judgment on the ground that 
its employee had stipulated with it that he assumed the risk of 
injury and that this stipulation makes it against equity and good 
conscience for him to enforce a judgment obtained in disregard of 
it, it being previously established that the federal statute prohibiting 
the federal courts from granting injunctions to stay proceedings 
in state courts does not apply to prevent the enforcement of judg-
ments obtained against equity and good conscience. The stipula-
tion which it was against equity and good oonscience to disregard 
was one which the Federal Employers' Liability Act, if applicable, 
22 254 U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. 93 (1920). 
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would render of no effect. After holding that the Liability Act 
does not apply to employees of express companies, since they are 
not "common carriers by railroad," Mr. Justice Van Devanter 
declares that "it follows that the act has no bearing on the liability 
of either company or on the validity of the messenger's agreement." 
This apparently negatives any implication that Congress had taken 
over the regulation of liability for the injury in question so as to 
preclude the further application of state law .. Mr. Justice Van 
Devanter goes on to say that "there being no statute regulating the 
subject, it is settled by the decisions of this court, and is i;;ecognized 
in other jurisdictions, that the messenger's agreement was a valid 
and binding contract." The decisions cited in support do not include 
any from Mississippi, the state in which the offensive judgment 
was rendered. The decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, seems 
to mean that if a state court in affirming a state judgment applies 
a common-law rule in the realm of general jurisprudence which is 
not to the taste of the United States Supreme Court, the advantage 
of the state judgment may be taken away by a federal court which 
gets jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship at the suit 
of an interested third party. If the decision means anything less 
than this, the restriction is dependent upon elements in the situation 
not adverted to in Mr. Justice Van Devanter's opinion. 
( c) Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction. 
The "settled rule" that "a contract for the complete construction 
of a ship or supplying materials therefor is non-maritime and not 
within the admiralty jurisdiction" was adduced in Thames Towboa,t 
Co. v. The Francis McDonald23 to justify the exclusion from that 
jurisdiction of a suit on a contract for completing a ship after the 
hull had been put into the water. 
That the admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to suits in sub-
stance against a state was held in two cases. In re State of New 
York (Petition of Walsh) 24 was a libel in reni against a ship owned 
privately but chartered to the superintendent of public works of 
New York, against whom the owners secured the issue of a moni-
tion. Against this monition the Supreme Court issued a prohibition 
23 254 U. S. 242, 41 Sup. Ct. 65 ( 1920). 
24 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 588 (1921). See 21 Cor,uM. L. Riw. 718. 
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on the ground that it was an attempt to bring an action in personam 
in substance against the state. The contention that this result 
enabled New York tOI impose its local law upon the admiralty juris-
diction to the detriment of the characteristic symmetry and uni-
formity of the rules of maritime law was answered by saying that 
"it is not inconsistent with this principle to accord to the states, 
which enjoy the prerogatives of sovereignty to the extent of being 
exempt from litigation at the suit of individuals in all other judi-
cial tribunals, a like exemption in the courts of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction." In re State of New York (The Queen City) 2 G 
was a libel in rem. against a tug owned by the state. Mr. Justice 
Pitney declared that "the principle so uniformly held to exempt the 
property of municipal corporations employed for public and gov-
ernmental purposes from seizure by admiralty process in rem applies 
with even greater force to exempt public property of a state ui;ed 
and employed for public and governmental purposes."26 
2 G 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 592 ( 1921). 
26 Four cases involving ships in which foreign governments claimed some 
proprietary interest were treated as raising questions of the construction of 
the federal statute defining jurisdiction in admiralty, without any sugges-
tion that they might be without the jurisdiction possible under the Consti-
tution. In re Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 609 (1921), 
declined to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the district court from 
libelling a ship owned by the Turkish government and used for commercial 
purposes, giving as a reason that it is far from plain that there is absence 
of jurisdiction, so that the issue would not be determined on application 
for prohibition, since when the question of jurisdiction is doubtful the 
granting or withholding of a writ of prohibition is discretionary. The same 
attitude was taken in Ex Parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 41 Sup. Ct. 185 (1921), 
commented on in 34 HARV. L. Rsv. 782, 16 ILL. L. Rsv. 247, and 6g U. PA. 
L. Rsv. 385, in which private counsel for the British embassy sought a writ 
of prohibition against a libel of a privately owned vessel alleged by him to 
be an· admiralty transport in the service of the British government. While 
Mr. Justice Van Devanter remarked that the British government is entitled 
as of right to appear in the suit and raise the jurisdictional question, he 
suggested that it is better practice to make the asserted immunity of the 
vessel a subject of diplomatic representations so that the executive depart-
ment may pass on the claim and make what it thinks the appropriate sug-
gestion to the court In The Pesaro, 255 U. S. 216, 41 Sup. Ct. 3o8 (1921), 
the district court had, on the suggestion of the Italian ambassador that the 
ship in question was owned by his government, dismissed the libel. This 
was held erroneous on the ground that the suggestion, to be entertained, 
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( d) Controversies between Two or More States. 
New York v. New J ersey21 was a suit to enjoin the pollution of the 
waters of New York bay by the discharge of sewage. While it does 
not appear that the defendant denied the jurisdiction of the United 
States Supreme Court, the court takes pains to point out explicitly 
that the jurisdiction obtains. After remarking that New York, for 
the purpose of showing its right to maintain the suit, set forth an 
agreement between it and New Jersey fixing the boundary between 
the two states and giving to New York, to an extent agreed, exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the waters of the Bay of Ne~v York, Mr. 
Justice Clarke continues : 
"But we need not inquire curiously as to the rights of the 
state of New York derived from this compact, for, wholly 
aside from it, and regardless of the precise location of the 
boundary line, the right of the state to maintain such a suit 
as is stated in the bill is very clear. The health, comfort 
and prosperity of the people of the state and the value of 
their property being gravely menaced, as it is averred that 
they are by the proposed action of the defendants, the state 
is the proper party to represent and defend such rights by 
resort to the remedy of an original suit in this court under 
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States." 
While there was no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court, Mr. 
Justice Clarke observed that such problems as the adjustment of 
should come through official channels of the United States. The subsequent 
decision of the district court is discussed in 35 HARv. L. REv. 330, 337. The 
same issue was involved in The Carlo Poma, 255 U. S. 2I9, 41 Sup. Ct. 309 
(I92I), but the action taken was to vacate the decision of the Circuit Court 
of Appeals and to remand the case to it with orders to dismiss the appeal 
from the district court, since, the issue being one of jurisdiction, the only 
appeal was direct to the Supreme Court. Several of the cases reviewed in 
this paragraph are considered in J. Whitla Stinson, "The Requisitioned and 
the Government-owned Ship," 20 MICH. L. REY. 407. 
Other questions of admiralty jurisdiction are discussed in J. Whitla 
Stinson, "Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction of the Courts of Great Brit-
ain, France and the United States," I6 Ir.r.. L. REv. I; and in a note in IS 
!Lr.. L. REY. 465 on the enforcement in admiralty of a state statute giving 
action for wrongful death. 
27 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 492 (I92I). See 35 HARV. L. REv. 322. 
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disputes over sewage are more likely to be solved by wise coopera-
tion between the states involved than by proceedings in any court, 
however constituted. The court did not share New York's appre-
hension as to the danger of pollution and so denied the injunction, 
but without prejudice to the filing of another bill. 
Various aspects of boundary controversies were treated in 0 kla-
homa v. Texas,28 Oklahoma v. Texas,20 and Arkansas v. },[issis-
si.ppi,30 in none of which was there any issue as to the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
( e) Suits against a State or the United States. 
The reasons why a state is exempt from suit are reviewed by 
Mr. Justice Pitney in In re State of New York (Petition of 
Walsh).31 While the Eleventh Amendment in terms forbids only 
suits in law or equity brought against a state by a citizen of another 
state, this special wording "was the outcome of a purpose to set 
aside the effect of the decision" in Chisholm v. Georgia; and in 
Hans v. Louisiana "the court demonstrated the impropriety of con-
struing the amendment so as to leave it open for citizens to sue 
their own state in the federal courts; and it seems to us equally 
clear that it cannot with propriety be construed to leave open a suit 
against a state in the admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether 
its own citizens or not." This, it is to be noted, goes no further 
than to say that the Eleventh Amendment does not impliedly author-
ize the suits against a state that it fails explicitly to forbid. The 
real basis of the decision holding a state entirely exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the federal court is a general principle opposed to 
the line of thought in Chisholm v. Georgia. As Mr. Justice Pitney 
puts it: 
"That a state may not be sued without its consent is a 
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a 
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the 
United States that it has become established by repeated 
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted 
by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain 
28 256 U. S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. 420 ( 1921). 
29 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 539 (1921). 
30 256 U. S. 28, 41 Sup. Ct. 444 ( 1921). 
a1 Note 24 supra. 
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a suit brought by private parties against a state without con-
sent given; nor one· brought by citizens of another state, or 
by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, because of the 
Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own 
citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the amend-
ment is but an exemplification." 
The question whether a suit is one against a state "is to be deter-
mined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by the essen-
tial nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the 
entire record." Suits against a state are "not confined to cases 
where the suit will operate so as to compel the_ state specifically to 
perform its _contracts," but include also "such as will require it to 
make pecuniary satisfaction for any liability." In the case at bar the 
superintendent of public works would be affected in his official 
capacity and not otherwise and the effect of any decree "would 
expend itself upon the people of the state of New York in their 
public and corporate capacity." This decision was followed in 
fa re State of New York (The Queen City),32 in which a writ of 
prohibition was issued against a libel in reni against a ship owned 
by the state. 
In Port of .Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co.33 a municipal corpora-
tion which had brought a suit in a state court to quiet title to a 
parcel of land objected to removal of the case to the federal court 
on the ground of diversity of citizenship because, as it contended, 
the land in question was owned by the state, which was therefore 
the real party in interest. To this the court answered that the 
municipality has an independent financiai interest in the controversy, 
that suit against it would not be prevented by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and that there is no occasion to consider what effect the judg-
ment in the case would have upon the state's interest. Doubtless 
this result was reached the more readily because the litigation on its 
merits was decided in favor of the municipality.34 
32 Note 25, supra. 
33 255 U. S. 56, 4r Sup. Ct. 237 ( r92r). 
3~ The holding on the main issue was that the rights acquired by a 
grantee of the state in lands adjoining a waterway depend wholly upon state 
law, and that the company's claim that it was entitled to continued access 
to the waterway was unsupported by the law of the state of Washington. 
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In the preceding cases it is recognized that suits against state 
officers acting under an unconstitutional statute are not suits against 
a state. This finds illustration in San Antonio v. San Antonio Pitb-
lic Service Commission,30 in which it is observed that a federal court 
has jurisdiction to enjoin a rate prescribed by a state which is 
admittedly confiscatory. 
The same principle applies to suits against federal officers. In 
Payne v. Central Pacific Ry. Co.36 a suit to enjoin the secretary of 
the interior from cancelling a selection of indemnity lands was held 
not a suit against the United States when the selection is valid and 
the secretary's threatened cancellation is based on a misconception 
of his authority. So also in Kennington v. Palmer31 an injunction 
restraining the attorney general from enforcing the, unconstitu-
tional provisions of the Lever Act was ordered by the Supreme 
Court after the lower court had dismissed the bill on the ground 
that the· plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. That the suit 
was not one against the United States was assumed without dis-
cussion, Chief Justice White contenting himself with saying that 
"as it is no longer open to deny that the averments of unconstitu-
tionality which were relied upon, if well founded, justified equitable 
relief under their bill, and because the opinion in the Cohen case 
has conclusively settled that they were well founded, it follows that 
the court below was wrong." The cases adduced in support were 
ones in which the Supreme Court had previously determined the 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of statutes in proceedings to 
enjoin officers from enforcing or threatening to enforce the crim-
inal provisions of the law, but in which the propriety of the remedy 
was not given explicit consideration by the Supreme Court. This 
important method of securing an early adjudication of constitu-
tional issues now receives explicit sanction. 
The principle that the United States cannot be sued without its 
consent is applied in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. AuU38 to reverse a 
judgment against the director general of railroads for a penalty 
provided by state law for delay in paying to an employee the wages 
30 255 U. S. 547, 4I Sup. Ct. 428 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. :RIW. 28I. 
36 255 U. S. 228, 4I Sup. Ct 3I4 (I92I). 
37 255 U. S. IOO, 4I Sup. Ct. 303 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. RIW. 9. 
38 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 593 (192I). 
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due at the time of his discharge. The government had consented 
to be sued and had provided that the lawful police regulations of 
the states should continue unimpaired while the roads were under 
federal control. Notwithstanding this, it was held that there was 
nothing in the purpose or spirit of the act "to indicate that Congress 
intended to authorize suit against the government for a penalty, if 
it should fail to perform the legal obligation imposed."30 
2. Requisites of Jwrisdiction Over Defe1idant 
The railroad made defendant in Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. 
Anderson-Tully Co.40 objected that the district in which suit was 
brought was not one "through which the road of the carrier runs" 
within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act and that the 
person on whom process was served was not its agent. On the 
latter issue the return of the marshal was held conclusive in the 
absence of any evidence to controvert it other than the stipulation 
that the road was under federal control at the time. For all this, 
says Mr. Justice Clarke, the person served might have been the 
agent of the defendant as well as of the government. On the stat-
. utory issue of venue, the defendant was held to be running its road 
in the district when it ran its cars therein over the line of another 
road for which it paid on a mileage basis. This arrangement was 
held to make it substantially a lessee.41 
3. Procedural Requirements 
An ancient Delaware statute which prevented non-residents from 
defending on the merits suits begun against them by attachment of 
property, unless they filed a bond to tqe value of the property, was 
119 The statutes authorizing suits against the government are reviewed 
in United States v. Pfitsch, note I8, sitpra. In 8 CALIF. L. Ri;v. 342 is a 
note on the corporate entity in government-owned corporations; in I5 ILL. 
L. fuv. 399 one On' the liability of the railroads to be sued when under gov-
ernment control. · 
40 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 524 (I92I). 
41 For notes on questions of jurisdiction over defendants, see 9 CALIF. 
L. fuv. 74 on the effect of a general appearance after judgment, in 21 
COLU:M. L. fuv. 286 on jurisdiction over debtor by service on agent, in 21 
Co1,u:M. L. fuv. 362 on when a foreign corporation is doing business in a 
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sustained in Ownbey v. M organ42 against the complaints that it 
took property without due process of law, denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws and abridged the immunities of citizens of the 
United States. The third objection was answered by invoking the 
principle that the immunities protected are "only such as owe their 
existence to the federal government, its national character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws." The equal-protection complaint was predi-
cated on the fact that foreign corporations might appear and defend 
without giving security, but this distinction the court thought rea-
sonable. Respect for age saved the statute under the due process 
clause. The provision was descended from the Custom of London, 
it had relatives in other states in times past, it belonged to "a time 
honored method of procedure" and was a "time-honored require-
ment of security," and the sfate in adopting it had adhered "logic-
ally to the ancient distinction between a proceeding quasi in rem 
and an action in personam." The general and special considerations 
militating against decl<!-ring such a Methuselah an outlaw under the 
due-process clause are put by Mr. Justice Pitney as follows : 
"The due process clause does not impose upon the states 
a duty to establish ideal systems for the administration of 
justice, with every modern improvement and with provision 
against every possible hardship that may befall. It restrains 
state action, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, within 
bounds that. are consistent with the fundamentals of individ-
ual liberty and private property, including the right to be 
heard where liberty or property is at stake in judicial pro-
ceedings. But a property owner who absents himself from 
the territorial jurisdiction of a state, leaving his property 
within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to consent that a 
state, and 21 Cor.u:i.r. L. Rsv. 494 on jurisdiction by service on a person 
within the state to attend court. 
Questions somewhat analogous are considered in Albert Levitt, "The 
Domicile of a Married Woman," 91 CEN'l'. L. J. 4 24; Ale."<:. Simpson, Jr., 
"What Constitutes a Voting Residence in Pennsylvania," 69 U. PA. L. Rsv. 
l; and notes on the domicil of a married woman in 21 Cor.u:i.r. L. ~- 488 
and 30 YALE L. J. 631, and on the power of equity to deal with a res in a 
foreign jurisdiction in 30 YALE L. J. 865. 
42 256 U.S. 94. 41 Sup. Ct. 433 (1921). See 19 ~lCH. L. ~- 853. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
state may subject such property to judicial process to answer 
demands made against him in his absence, according to any 
practicable method that reasonably may be adopted. A pro-
cedure customarily employed, long before the Revolution, in 
the commercial metropolis of England, and generally adopted 
by the states as suited to their circumstances and needs, can-
not be deemed inconsistent with due process of law, even if 
it be taken with its ancient incident of; requiring security 
from a defendant who after seizure of his property comes 
within the jurisdiction and seeks to interpose a defense. The 
condition has a reasonable relation to the conversion of a 
proceeding quasi in rem into an action in personani; ordi-
narily it is not difficult to comply with-a man who has prop-
erty usually has friends and credit-and hence in its normal 
operation it must be regarded as a permissible condition; and 
it cannot be deemed so arbitrary as to render the procedure 
inconsistent with due process of law when applied to a 
defendant who, through exceptional misfortune, is unable to 
furnish the necessary security; certainly not where such a 
defendant, as is the case now presented, so far as the record 
shows, has acquired the property right and absented himself 
from the state .after the practice was established, and hence 
with notice that his property situate there would be subject 
to disposition under foreign attachment by the very method 
that afterwards was pursued, and that he would have no right 
to enter appearance and make defense except upon giving 
security. 
"However desirable it is that the old forins of procedure 
be improved with the progress of time, it cannot rightly be 
said that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a universal 
and self-executing remedy. Its function is negative, not 
affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular measures 
of reform. For instance, it does not constrain the states to 
accept particular modem doctrines of equity, or adopt a 
combined system of law and equity pr6cedure, or dispense 
with all necessity for form and method in pleading, or give 
untrammeled liberty to make amendments. Neither does it, 
as we think, . require a state to relieve the hardship of an 
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ancient and familiar method of procedure by dispensing with 
the exaction of special security from an appearing defendant 
·in foreign attachment." 
Mr. Justice McReynolds confined his concurrence to the result and 
Chief Justice White and Mr. Justice Clarke dissented.43 
One of the objections to the Act of Congress regulating rents in 
the District of Columbia was stated and answered by Mr. Justice 
Holmes in Block v. Hirsh44 as follows: 
"The statute is objected to on the further ground that land-
lords and tenants are deprived by it of a trial by jury on 
the right to possession of the land. If the power of the 
commission established by the statute to regulate the relation 
is established, as we think it is, by what we have said, this 
objection amounts to little. To regulate the relation and to 
decide the facts affecting it are hardly separable. While the 
act is in force there is little to decide except whether the 
rent allowed is reasonable, and upon that question the courts 
are given the last word. A part of the exigency is to secure 
a speedy and summary administration of the law, and we 
are not prepared to say that the suspension of ordinary rem-
edies was not a reasonable provision of a statute reasonable 
in its aim and intent."45 
43 The eligibility of women for jury service is considered in I9 MICH. 
L. REv. 662, 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 3I8, and 6g U. PA. L. RJ>v. 386; the extent to 
which the legislature may regulate judicial procedure, in 34 HARV. L. Riw. 
424, 434; the validity of court rules when in opposition to statute, in 5 
MINN. L. R.Ev. 73; the power of a provost martial during riots, in I5 Iu,. 
L. RJ>v. 469; the relation between civil and military courts, in I5 ILL. L. Riw. 
334- In 19 MICH. L. REv. 445 is a discussion of a decision holding that an 
allowance for e..'t:penses is not an increase in the compensation of a judge. 
44 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (I921), 20 MICH. L. RJ>v. 9, 274. 
45 Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 41 Sup. Ct. 230 (I92I), inter-
preting the federal statute disqualifying a judge against whom an affidavit 
of personal prejudice and bias is filed, is discussed in 2I Cox.UM. L. RJ>v. 
387, 16 ILL. L. RJ>v. I43, 19 MICH. L. RJ>v. 637, 6 VA. L. fuG. n. s. 938, and 
7 VA. L. REV. 547. In 6 CORNELL L. Q. II7 is a note on disqualification of a 
judge for relationship to attorney; in 34 HARV. L. RJ>v. 2I6 one on disquali-
fication for relationship to party; in 30 YALE L. J. 305 one on disqualifica-
tion for interest in the cause. 
In re Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 543 (I920), 19 MICH. L. RJ>v. 
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4. Faith and Credit to Proceedings of Sister States 
No cases which technically fall under this head were d~cided 
during the past term, but -issues of res adjitdicata involving anal-
ogous principles appear in various decisions. Sitpreme Tribe of 
Ben Hur v. Cauble46 held that all members of a class are privies to 
a class suit and bound by the decree, since otherwise the "unfortu-
nate situation may result in the determination of the rights of most 
of the class by a decree rendered upon a theory which may be 
repudiated in another forum as to a part of the same class." Okla-
homa v. Texas47 held the plaintiff state concluded by a decree in a 
former boundary suit brought against the defendant state by the 
United States prior to the admission of Oklahoma to statehood. 
Privett v. United States48 .held the United States not bound by a 
decree in a former suit brought by Indians to cancel pat-
ents since it was not a formal party and has an interest in the 
enforcement of the restrictions against alienation which is distinct 
from that of the Indians. Economy Light and Power Co. v. United 
States49 held the United States not concluded by a decree in a suit 
brought by a state to determine whether a river is a navigable 
water of the United States. New Orleans Land Co. v. Leader 
Realty Co.50 found that a prior decree ordering a sale of land was 
not an adjudication in rem and so did not conclude third parties 
claiming an interest in the land. Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. 
Blincoe51 found that an issue determined by a state court on a 
retrial after a prior aecision had been reversed by the Supreme 
308, allowing the appointment of an auditor in an action at law in the fed-
eral courts, is treated in 20 Cor.uM. L. Rlw. 805; 34 HARV. L. Rev. 32r, 338; 
and 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 2g6. Questions of federal procedure are discussed 
in Charles C. Moore, "Proposed Bill Regulating Federal Appellate Pro-
cedure," 24 LAW NO'l'ES r48; notes on uniform federal procedure, in 20 
Cor.uM. L. Rev. 906 and 7 VA. L. RltG. n. s. 48; and notes on the constitu-
tionality of partial new trials on the question of damages only, in 34 HARV. 
L. Rev. 7r, 86; 5 MINN. L. Rev. r44; and 69 U. PA. L. Rev. 71. 
46 Note 2r, s11pra. 
47 Note 28, s11pra. 
4 8 256 U. S. -, 4r Sup. Ct. 455 (192r). 
49 256 U. S. n3, 41 Sup. Ct. 409 (192r), 20 MrcH. L. Rev. r35. 
5o 255 U. S. 266, 266, 41 Sup. Ct. 259 (192r). 
51 Note 3, s11Pra. See 30 YAI.e L. J. 765. 
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Court was a new issue not previously passed upon by the Supreme 
Court and one which depended on state law on which the state 
court is the final authority. The case illustrates the distinction 
between what is a bar to a subsequent action after a former one has 
been finally concluded and what is the law of a case for a retrial.52 
IX. AnMINIS'l\RA.TIVE PO\VER AND PROCEDURE 
Since the principle of the separation of powers is assumed to be 
part of the constitutional structure of the national government, 
questions of the validity and effect of administrative action concern 
constitutional law indii;ectly if not directly. During the past term 
of court power exercised by administrative officers. was held to be 
within their statutory authority in La Motte v. United States,53 
Stoehr v. Wallace,u4 United States v. Bowling,05 and Milwaitkee 
Publishing Co. v. Burleson,56 but beyond the authority delegated 
in Payne v. Central Pacific Ry. Co.,01 Payne v. Newton,58 and S1tt-
ton v. United States.59 Executive interpretation of a treaty was 
accorded weight and followed in Sullivan v. Kidd;60 administrative 
52 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 4n, 40 Sup. Ct. 37I (I920), Ig 
MICH. L. RJ;v. 3n, holding that a state must give effect to a judgment of 
a sister state on a cause of action that could not have been sued on in the 
second state, is treated in 3 ILL. L. BULL. 68. For discussions of the full 
faith and credit clause see Mayer C. Brown, "The Validity of a Michigan 
Divorce Decree in Foreign States and Foreign Countries," 4 B1-MoNTH. 
L. fuv., No. 5, page 36; John T. Richards, "The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the Federal Constitution as Applied to Suits for Divorce," 15 ILL. 
L. fuv. 259; and notes on the recognition of foreign divorce decrees in 2I 
Coum. L. Riw. g8 and 6 CORNELL L. Q. 323. Questions of conflict of laws 
are treated in notes in 21 CoLUM. L. fuv. 366 on statutes of limitations, in 
2I COLUM. L. RJ;v. 585 on usury, in 21 CoLUM. L. fuv. on foreign recording 
acts after removal of chattels, in 34 HARV. L. RJ;v. 553 on the recognition 
of foreign judgments, in 19 MICH. L. REv. 220 on suits by foreign e.xecutors, 
in 19 MICH. L. R.l;v. 344 on statutes disinheriting an heir who kills his ances-
tor, and in 30 YALE L. J. 860 on foreign judgments in interpleader. 
53 254 U. S. 570, 41 Sup. Ct. 204 ( r92I), 20 MICH. L. fuv. II. 
54 255 U.S. 239, 41 Sup. Ct. 293 (I92I), 20 MrcH. L. fuv. 5. 
55 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 561 (I92I). 
56 255 U. S. 407, 4I Sup. Ct. 352 ( I92I), 20 MICH. L. fuv. 6. 
67 255 U. S. 228, 41 Sup. Ct. 3I4 (I92I). 
58 255 U. S. 438, 4I Sup. Ct. 368 (I92I). 
59 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 563 (I92I). 
60 254 U. S. 433, 4I Sup. Ct. I58 (I92I). 
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construction of statutes was held persuasive and adopted in Blanset 
v. Cardin,61 McLaren v. Fleischer,62 ,and Culpepper v. Ocheltree,63 
but rejected as erroneous in Payne v. N ewton64 and Payne v. Cen-
tral Pacific Ry. Co.65 Administrative findings were accorded respect 
and accepted in Edward Rutledge Timber Co. v. Farrell,66 Milwau-
kee Publishing Co. v. Bitrleson,61 and Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. 
v. United States.68 Failure of administrative authorities to take 
action was held a bar to the desires of petitioners in Economy Light 
& Power Co. v. United States,6° Chase, Jr., v. United States,10 and 
Gilpin v. United States,11 but not in Wyoming v. United States12 
and Payne v. New M e.xico.13 An administrative construction of a 
statute was held in Hall v. Payne14 not to be arbitrary or capricious 
and therefore to be not subject to control by mandamus. Whether 
it might be rejected in proper proceedings was neither denied nor 
affirmed. 
A constitutional issue as to the adequacy of administrative pro-
cedure was raised in Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson,15 which 
held that due process was satisfied by the hearing accorded to the 
publisher of a newspaper before an assistant postmaster general in 
which there was full opportunity to urge that the paper was not 
guilty of utterances warranting a revocation of its second-Class 
mailing privilege. In reviewing the conclusion reached, the court 
proceeded upon the principle that it must stand unless the court is 
clearly convinced that it is wrong. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in dis-
senting, raised constitutional objections to the power exercised and 
61 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 519 (1921). 
62 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 577 (1921). 
63 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 579 (1921). 
6 4 Note 58, supra. 
65 Note 57, supra. 
66 255 U. S. 268, 41 Sup. Ct. 328 ( 1921). 
67 Note 56, snpra. 
68 254 U.S. 57, 41 Sup. Ct. 24 (1921). 
69 256 U.S. n3, 41 Sup. Ct. 409 (1921), 20 MICH. L. ~v. 135. 
10 256 U, S, 1, 41 Sup. Ct. 417 (1921). 
71 256 U. S. 10, 41 Sup. Ct. 419 (1921). 
12 255 U. S. 489, 41 Sup. Ct. 393 (1921). 
73 255 U.S. 367, 41 Sup. Ct. 333 (1921). 
74 254 U. S. 343, 41 Sup. Ct. 131 (1920). 
15 Note 56, supra. See 21 Cor.u:r.r. L. ~v. 715. 
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the action taken, but did not contend that the administrative pro-
cedure was inadequate if administrative action was fitting. Ques-
tions of administrative procedure in the assessment of state taxes 
were passed upon in Turner v. Wade76 and St. Louis-San Francisco 
Ry. Co. v. Middlekamp,77 already considered in the "section on 
taxation.78 
Some question as to the power of a state to delegate to a board 
discretion to direct the removal of grade crossings was raised in 
Erie R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,1° but Mr. 
Justice Holmes answered: 
"The state courts seem to regard the words as imposing 
a positive duty, but upon either construction we perceive no 
infraction of the. company's constitutional rights. If the 
words are imperative the reasons that we have given ·apply. 
If they leave a discretion it is subject to review by the courts, 
and this court has no concern with the question how far 
legislative or quasi-legislative powers may be delegated to a 
commission or board." 
Examples of the delegation of power to state administrative author-
ities appear in Johnson v. Maryland,80 Nicchia v. New York,81 
Thornton v. Duffy,82 Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Board,83 
Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,84 already 
reviewed, and also in many of the cases involving the regulation 
of public utilities. The administrative power sustained in Block v. 
Hirsh85 was to modify the terms of existing leases which condi-
76 254 U. S. 64, 4I Sup. Ct. 27 (I920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I62. 
77 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 489 (IgzI), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I62. 
7 s Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 42I, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 
( I920), 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 23, 3I6, is discussed in 20 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 8o6 and 
6 CoRNtr.L L. Q. 320; Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 40 Sup. Ct. 
4Io (I920), 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 3I9, in 9 CALIF. L. Rsv. 433. An English deci-
sion on hearing in deportation cases is noted in 30 YALt L. J. ¢. 
79 254 U. S. 394, 4I Sup. Ct. I69 (I921), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 283, 286. 
so 254 U. S. 51, 4I Sup. Ct. I6 (1920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 265. 
81 254 U. S. 228, 4I Sup. Ct. 103 (I920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I70, 265. 
82 254 U. S. 36I, 4I Sup. Ct. 137 (1920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 267. 
83 255 U. S. i44 4I Sup. Ct. 252 (1921), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 269. 
84 255 U. S. 445, 41 Sup. Ct. 373 (I921), 20 MtcH. L. Rsv. 271. 
ss Note 44 supra. · 
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tion the rights of tenants to continue occupancy. The constitution-
ality of the delegation was affirmed as an incident to the general 
power to regulate the relation between landlord and tenant. Ques-
tions of statutory construction as to the method of securing judi-
cial review of commission action are considered in Vandalia R. Co. 
v. Schnull86 and Hollis v. Kutz.81 In re State of New York (The 
Queen City) 88 accepts the suggestion of the attorney general of the 
state that a ship belongs to the state as a proper mode of presenting 
the issue to the court.89 
A few stray adjudications on matters relating to the administra-
tion of the national government may be mentioned. Krichman v. 
United States9° holds that a baggage porter on a railroad under fed-
eral control is not an officer of the United States within the mean-
ing of~ statute punishing bribery of officers.91 Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Poston,92 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. A.ult,93 and Nor-
folk-Sou-them R. Co. v. Owen94 reaffirm the principle that the 
86 255 U. S. u3, 41 Sup. Ct. 324 (r92I), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 279. 
87 255 U. S. 452, 41 'Sup. Ct. 371 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 282. 
88 Note 32, supra. 
89 Questions of administrative law are considered in Walter Carrington, 
"Delegation of Power to Boards and Commissions," 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. Sor; 
Laurence Curtis, 2d, "Judicial Review of Commission," 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
862; Nathan Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 30 YAI.E 
L. J. 781; and notes in 6 CORNELL L. Q. 325 on injunction against referendum 
election; in 15 Ir,L. L. R.Ev. 400 and 19 MICH. L. REv. 2rr on delegating to 
fire marshal power to designate dangerous buildings; in 15 Ir,r,. L. R.Ev. 223 
on delegation of judicial power; in 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 2I3 on making state 
medical association the state board of health; in 19 MrcH. L. REV. 648 on 
giving to· police commissioner control of licensing private detectives; in 19 
MrcH. L. R.Ev. 640 on arbitrary power to revoke licenses to sell soft drinks; 
in 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 56g on finality of administrative determinations under 
Torrens land system; in 6g U. PA. L. R.Ev. 152 on conclusiveness of a sher-
iffs return; and in 27 W. VA. L. Q. 84, 92, on judicial control of adminis-
trative judgment as to the validity of bonds. 
90 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 514 · ( r92r). 
91 The question whether an inspector of the Fleet Corporation is an officer 
of the United States is considered in 21 Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 485; the personal 
liability of a justice of the peace for his official neglects in 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
219, 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 482, and 7 VA. L. R.Ev. 558. 
02 256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 598 (1921). 
93 Note 38, sitPra. 
94 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 597 (1921). 
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United States cannot be sued without its consent.95 In United States 
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co.96 it is affirmed that laches may deprive 
the United States of the privilege of invoking the equitable prin-
ciple suspending the statute of limitations in actions for fraud until 
the fraud is discovered. It was held, however, that there was no· 
]aches where the fraud was clandestine. Harris v. District of 
Col1tnibia91 holds that a municipal corporation is immune from lia-
bility for injuries caused by the fault of employees engaged in 
sweeping the streets.98 
X. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
Several cases presented the question whether state police meas-
ures were unconstitutional interferences with the exercise of the 
95 The consent of the United States to be sued is considered in Judson 
A. Crane, "Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Claims," 34 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. I6I. 
96 2ss U. S. 323, 4I Sup. Ct. 33S ( I92I). 
912s6 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 6Io (I92I). 
9s The tort liability of municipal corporations is considered in notes in 
20 Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 772; 6 CoRNELI. L. Q. 207; 34 HARv. L. R.Ev. 66, 9I; I9 
MICH. L. R.Ev. s69, 7S8; S MINN. L. R.Ev. 326; 7 VA. L. R.Ev. 383, s62; 27 W. 
VA. L. Q. 94; and 30 YAr.S L. J. 87, 303, 42s. 
For other discussions of the law of municipal corporations, see 9 CAI.IF. 
L. R.Ev. I6I, I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 3S2, and 30 YAI.S L. J. 304 on power to act 
beyond boundaries; 20 Cor.m.r. L. R.Ev. 799 on proper park purposes; 2I 
Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 99 on use of streets for private purposes; 2I Cor.uM. L. Rev. 
490 on acquisition of highway by prescription; 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 439 on 
liability for services under void contract; 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 439 on power 
to authorize nuisances in streets; I6 Ir.r.. L. R.Ev. I30 on vacation of streets; 
I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. S70 on letting contracts to lowest bidder; I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
7S7 on power to act as trustee; I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 884 on implied powers and 
ultra vires; S MINN. L. R.Ev. ISI on whether paving law is an uniform law; 
30 YAI.E L. J. 302 on liability to garnishment; and 30 YAI.E L. J. 420 on 
estoppel against a municipality. 
For want of a better place, mention may here be made of William Ander-
son, "The Constitution of Minnesota,'' S MINN. L. R.Ev. 407; W. L. Jenks, 
"History of Michigan Constitutional Provision Prohibiting a General Revi-
sion of the Laws,'' I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 6IS; Willard L. King, "Draftsmanship 
of the [Illinois] Constitution of I870,'' IS Ir.r.. L. R.Ev. 447; Urban A. Lavery, 
"Revising a Constitution,'' IS !Lr.. L. R.Ev. 437; Leonard D. White, "The New 
Hampshire Constitutional Convention," I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 383; and a note in 
2I Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. I82 on proportional representation. 
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powers of the national government. Johnson v. Maryland99 held 
that a state may not require the driver of a mail truck to pass a 
test to determine his qualifications. It is the duty of the post office 
department to employ competent persons, declared Mr. Justice 
B:olmes, and it must be .presumed that this duty has been performed. 
vVhile the states may incidentally affect the action of drivers of 
mail wagons as by regulating the mode of turning corners, it can-
not go so far as to dictate the selection of employees of the United 
States government. State efforts to interrupt the acts of the fed-
eral government itself are subject to greater limitations than are 
efforts to regulate persons employed in interstate commerce, so that 
what may be held to affect interstate commerce only indirectly or 
incidentally will be regarded as a direct and unconstitutional inter-
ference with the federal government when applied to the execution 
of federal functions. Justices Pitney and McReynolds dissented. 
In Gilbert v. Minnesota100 the majority of the court found no 
interference with the federal government in a state law forbidding 
persons to teach that citizens should not enlist in the army or navy 
or should not assist the United States in time of war. Mr. Justice 
McKenna found the statute one in aid of the national government 
and not a hindrance to the execution of its powers and its policies. 
In dissenting, Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that the state statute 
was not confined to time of war and insisted that it might be the 
policy of the national government to have military and naval forces 
composed of volunteers who had enlisted after full consideration 
, . of the arguments against such participation. With such freedom 
of consideration the state statute would interfere. It also went 
beyond congressional legislation in prohibiting the teaching of doc-
trine, while Congress had confined its prohibitions to tangible 
obstructions. The state law might well promote disaffection which 
Congress sought to avoid by less drastic regulation. Congress by 
failure to impose prohibitions indicated its will that the action of 
the citizen should be untrammelled. Chief Justice White in a brief 
separate dissent expressed the opinion that "the subject matter is 
99 254 U. -S. SI, 4I Sup. Ct. I6 ( I920), 20 MICH. L. REv. 265. See 2I 
CoLUl\£. L. REv. 93, 34 HARV. L. REv. 434, 7 VA. L. REv. 3u, and 30 YALt 
L.J.426. . . 
100 254 U. S. 325, 4I Sup. Ct. I25 ( I920), 20 MICH. L. REv. IO, 265. 
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within the exclusive legislative power of Congress, when exerted, 
and that the action of Congress has covered the whole field." 
A state law regulating the sale of habit-forming drugs was sus-
tained in Whipple v. Martinson101 as against the objection that it 
interfered with the enforcement of the federal statute imposing a 
tax on prescribers and dispensers of such drugs. The state law for-
bade certain acts which the prohibitory provisions of the federal 
law did not forbid, provided records were kept of them, but this 
difference was held to impose an impediment to the enforcement of 
the federal law. Mr. Justice Day recognized the validity of the 
principle relied on by the drug dispenser, but found no ground for 
its application to the statute before the court. 
Several cases involved the applicability of state power to the 
railroads while under federal control. Congress had permitted the 
continued application of state police measures and state tax laws. 
An objection to a state franchise tax was held unfounded in St. 
Louis-Sa1i Francisco Ry. Co. v. Middlekanip.102 That the congres-
sional consent to apply the police laws of the state does not extend 
to laws imposing penalties for delay in paying wages was held in 
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Ault103 and Norfolk-Southern R. Co. v. 
Owens, 104 and it was declared to be a question of federal and not 
of state law whether an imposition is penal or compensatory. The 
companies were held not liable on common law principles, since 
after the assumption of federal control the defaults complained of 
were not their defaults. The lack of power to enforce state laws 
not sanctioned by Congress was predicated upon the impossibility 
of suing the United States government without its consent. So 
also in "fVestern Union Telegraph Co. v. Poston,1°0 Mr. Justice Bran-
deis declared that the common-law immunity of the telegraph com-
panies for acts and omissions of. the government is not affected by 
the fact that it may be impossible to sue the government, and that 
"if Congress has omitted to provide adequately for the protection 
of rights of the public, Congress alone can provide the remedy." 
101 256 U. S. 41, 41 Sup. Ct. 425 ( 1921), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 158. 
102 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 489 (1921), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. I62. 
103 Note 8, supra. 
104256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 597 (I921). 
1o5 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 598 ( 1921). 
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The doctrine that a receiver appointed by a federal court takes 
subject to all prior liens was invoked in Marshall ·v. New York106 
for the decision that the common-law priority lien of a state for 
unpaid taxes may be enforced against property in the custody of a 
federal receiver. A state requirement that an international bridge 
be altered to provide additional accommodations was held in Inter-
national Bridge Co. v. New York101 to be unimpeded by the fact 
that part of the land under the bridge had been conveyed to the 
United States, when the purpose of the conveyance was uncon~ 
nected with the administration of the government. 
State taxation of banks chartered by the federal government was 
declared unconstitutional in two cases. In Smith v. Kansas City 
Title & Trust Co.108 Mr. Justice Day, 1n affirming the power of 
Congress to exempt from state taxation the capital, surplus, income 
and mortgages of federal land banks and joint-stock land banks, 
referred to previous declarations "that the states were wholly with· 
out power to levy any tax directly or indirectly upon national banks, 
their property, assets or franchises, except so far as the permissive 
legislation of Congress allowed such taxation." This principle was 
the basis of the decision in Merchants National Bank of Richmond 
v. Richmond, 109 which held that a state could not impose a higher 
rate on national bank stock than on money loaned at interest by 
individuals, since Congress had qualified its permission to tax bank 
stock by the provision that the tax should not be "at a greater rate 
than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of indi-
vidual citizens of such state" and money loaned at interest is one 
kind of moneyed capital which Congress had in mind by "other 
moneyed capital."110 
One of the grounds of resistance to a special assessment in Choc-
taw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey111 was tha1l the complaining railroad 
was an instrumentality of the federal government for developing 
Indian coal lands ; but Mr. J ust~ce Brandeis answered that "the mere 
10s Note 7, supra. 
101 254 U. S. I26, 4I Sup. Ct. 56 (I920), 20 MICH. L. R.i>v. I4I, 285. 
108 Note I3, supra. 
109 256 U. S. -. 4I Sup. Ct. 6!9 (I921), 20 MICH. L. R.i>v. I72. 
110 An analogous issue is considered in Montgomery B. Angell, "State 
Usury Laws and the Federal Reserve Banks," 7 VA. L. Rl>v. 536. 
111 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 582 (192I), 20 MICH. L. R.i>v. 16g. 
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fact that property is used, among others, by the United States as 
an instrument for effecting its purpose does not relieve it from state 
taxation." 
Turning to federal powers alleged to interfere unconstitutionally 
with state functions, New York Trust Co. v. Eisner112 holds that 
the federal estates tax does not interfere with the power of the 
states to regulate descent and distribution. It had been held that 
no such interference was wrought by a federal legacy tax, but it 
was here argued that the estates tax is different since it "is cast 
upon a transfer while it is being effectuated by the state itself and 
therefore is an intrusion upon its processes." To this Mr. Justice 
Holmes answered that "if a tax on the property distributed by the 
laws of the state, determined by the fact that distribution has been 
accomplished, is valid, a tax determined by the fact that distributio~ 
is about to begin is no greater interference and is equally good."113 
That the federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit 
against a state is established by the Eleventh Amendment and by 
inference drawn therefrom as to suits not expressly within its terms. 
The principle is applied to suits otherwise within the admiralty 
jurisdiction in In re State of New York (Petition of Walsh) 114 
as to an action i1i personam, and in In re State of New York (The 
Queen City) 115 as to an action in rent.116 
Relations between states were involved in suits to which states 
were parties. New York v. New I ersey117 held that a state may 
enjoin a neighboring state from polluting intervening waters by 
sewage, but found the alleged pollution not established. 0 klahoma 
v. Texas118 held the plaintiff state concluded by the determination 
of a boundary in a prior suit between the defendant and the United 
112 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (1g.z1), 20 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 155. 
113 Federal taxation of income from state bonds is considered in Alex-
ander M. Hamburg, "Exemption of State and Municipal Securities from 
Federal Income Taxation," 7 VA, L. R.Ev. 195; Harry Hubbard, "From 
'Whatever Source Derived,'' 6 A. B. A. JouR. 203; and a note in 7 VA. L. 
R1w. 136. 
114 Note 24, supra. 
110 Note 25, szipra. 
116 The power of the federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of judg-
ments obtained in state courts is considered in 15 ILL. L. R.Ev. 466. 
111 Note 27, supra. 
11s Note 28, supra. 
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States before the plaintiff was a state. Another part of the contro-
versy still remained open, and in this various orders were issued 
in Oklahoma v. Texas.119 A report of commissioners locating a 
boundary in accord with an earlier decree was confirmed in Arkansas 
v. Mississippi.120 
Columbia University. THOMAS REED PowEr,r,. 
119 Note 29, supra. 
120 Note 30, supra. 
